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I just now got around to reading the article in Friday's NYT about the insurgency in Iraq. Assuming that this story is accurate - and it certainly tracks with everything I've been reading lately - three things come to mind.

First, this shows that Rep. Murtha is 100% right. If the insurgency is made up of hundreds of disconnected, uncoordinated groups that have nothing else in common except their desire to get us to leave, we have indeed become the enemy, and the only thing we accomplish by staying is ensuring that the insurgency continues.

Second, Iraq is absolutely not the "central front in the war on terror," unless you're counting the terror attacks that are created by our presenece there. "We're fighting them over there so that we don't hae to fight them over here?" Please. As this article makes claer, a VAST majority of the people we're fighting are locals unaffiliated with any global terror organization who simply want us out of their country. (Don't believe me? Read the new "Plan for Victory" for yourself. "Foreign terrorists" are descibed as the smallest group in the list of people making up "the enemy").

Granted, what they want to do with the nation after we leave is of significant concern, but that's clearly something that should have been thought through before the invasion. Now, well... its really unclear how we deal with that problem. Should we stay or should we go? Neither option is a good one, so the question is which one is less bad. And I'm not sure there's any way to know what will happen before it happens. That said...

Third, read the following paragraph and then explain to me how we're ever going to achieve "complete victory" if we stay:

But whatever the appearances, American and Iraqi officials agree on the essential structure of the Iraqi insurgency: it is horizontal as opposed to hierarchical, and ad hoc as opposed to unified. They say this central characteristic, similar to that of terrorist organizations in Europe and Asia, is what is making the Iraqi insurgency so difficult to destroy. Attack any single part of it, and the rest carries on largely untouched. It cannot be decapitated, because the insurgency, for the most part, has no head. Only recently, American and Iraqi experts say, have they begun to grasp the new organizational structure that, among other things, is making the insurgency so difficult to stop.

People love making the Vietnam comparison, but this is where it breaks down. In Vietnam there was a clearly defined enemy with a heirarchy and chain of command. Here, with a difuse network of unaffiliated and uncoordinated groups, it is quite difficult, perhaps even impossible, to imagine what "victory" might even mean. Just exactly who or what are we defeating? And how? Is the idea to spend the next 20 years fighting in Iraq?

More proof that the people who were responsible for this war didn't think through the details before launching it. And yes, that matters. Who exactly do you think is leading our war efforts today?

UPDATE: Wow. Great new piece from the UK's Telegraph that confirms much of what I just wrote. Check it out. Shall we?

Iraqis, rather than foreign fighters, now form the vast majority of the insurgents who are waging a ferocious guerrilla war against United States forces in Sunni western Iraq, American commanders have revealed. Their conclusion, disclosed to the Sunday Telegraph in interviews over 10 days in battle-torn Anbar province, contradicts the White House message that outsiders are the principal enemy in Iraq.

Funny that it starts with something I need to take issue with. The fact that Iraqis form the "vast majority" of the insurgents certainly contradicts the old White House line on things. But if you read even just the exectutive summry of the new "Plan for Victory," you'll notice it is directly in line with what the White House is saying now. As I said above, this would seem to call into question the whole "central front in the war on terror" concept, but nevertheless, we continue...

The insurgents have the support of most locals. "They have the ability to move freely around the city," said Capt Twain Hickman, the commander of India Company of the 3/7 US Marines battalion. "That means they can attack at a time of their choosing." Col Gronski said the local nature of the insurgency meant that even the few civic leaders prepared to work with the Americans view the fighters as legitimate. "They see them as resistance. They don't view these local guys placing IEDs [improvised explosive devices] and firing mortars at us as insurgents." Some Iraqis in Ramadi now adhere to Zarqawi's radical Islamist philosophy, but for most the insurgency is about removing the occupiers, Col Herbert said. "Their family and tribal honour has been impugned if we're on their ground. They're almost duty bound to fight." Unemployment, which is over 50 per cent, and widespread intimidation are also fuelling the insurgency. "It's economic," said Lt Col Robert Roggeman, who commands the 2/69 US Army battalion. "Two hundred bucks to shoot at an American, 50 bucks to lay down an IED

It seems we have direct confirmation from a commander on the ground that the NYT is right when they claim that most insurgents aren't part of the global terror movement - they simply want us to go home. Murtha is right. We have become the enemey, and critically, it is in a way that has nothing to do with the war on terror.

The Pentagon plan for the country is to hand over "battle space" to Iraqi forces once they are capable of combating the insurgency so that American forces can withdraw. But this scheme has been beset by problems in Ramadi. A year ago the local police force was disbanded because many of its members were insurgents. In October, the provincial police chief was arrested on suspicion of diverting salaries to fund the insurgency. There are three Iraqi army battalions in the town, comprised mainly of Shia troops from outside Ramadi, where the population is Sunni. If American troops exit prematurely, this could be a factor in sparking a civil war.

For those of you hoping that Bush's new plan would mean we'll be bringing our boys home soon, this section should prove quite troubling. Apparently the whole "when they stand up we'll stand down" thing has some very serious problems. Again, if you've been paying attention this shouldn't be much of a surprise, but nevertheless, this is significant empirical confirmation.

And the next section isn't any more comforting

Splits among insurgents, however, could assist the US aim to isolate Zarqawi's group. Recent weeks have seen what the military terms "red on red" gun battles between insurgent groups. Bombs near houses and one that killed civilians on a bus prompted the clashes and could have eroded Abu Khattab's support. "He is feared rather than popular," said Col Herbert. "He might be overstepping the mark." But the commander of one of the Iraqi battalions, who asked not to be named for fear of reprisals, said it would be "at least two or three years" before his men were ready to fight alone. "The terrorists control Ramadi and the mosques assist them," he said. "We are getting better but the Iraqi army is still weak and we need equipment. We always rely on the Americans to do the hardest jobs for us."

That's actually a pretty solid argument for us to stay a few more years. Unless, of course, our presence is as Murtha suggests strengtheing the insurgency. If that's true, it means staying would be a race between a strengthening insurgency and a strengthening Iraqi military. Of course, if the insurgency is fracturing, then who knows....

All more food for thought.

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