HOME | BIO | MUSIC | JOURNEYS BY DJ | STUDIO BLOG | POLITICAL BLOG | BOOKING INFO | CONTACT

That was quick. Two excerpts for you. First, the segment everyone will be and already is talking about:

We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.

• The Iraq conflict has become the “cause celebre” for jihadists, breeding a deep
resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for
the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves,
and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry
on the fight.

We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its
vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.

• Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1)
Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western
domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the
Iraq “jihad;” (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and
political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US
sentiment among most Muslims—all of which jihadists exploit.

Second, a section that so far seems to have been overlooked in most reporting and discussions of the report:

Al-Qa’ida, now merged with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role.

• The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and
al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into
smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the
mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements.
We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less
serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa’ida.

• Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks against
Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a global
threat.

• The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa’ida in Iraq might
lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations.

Three thoughts here.

One: As the first bullet point makes clear, this administration's inability to capture or kill Bin Laden and his key advisors clearly has significant implications. Remember that not only did Bush proudly proclaim that bin Laden wasn't a top priority, he also ordered the disbanding of CIA unit dedicated to hunting him down.

Second, the final bullet point seems to simply shred the president's "if we leave Iraq, the terrorists will follow us home" logic. As he has said numerous times, our stated goal is to "stand down as Iraqi forces stand up." But according to this NIE, that transfer of power will encourage many jihadis to leave Iraq even before we have left. Their "leaving," in other words, is not dependent or even contingent on our "leaving."

Worse, as bullet point one in the first excerpt shows, the longer we stay without achieving full victory, the more jihadis we are likely to inspire. That should have been obvious from the start, but given the way this administration has pursued this war, clearly it was not. Thus, the only conclusion is that unless we fully commit to doing whatever is necessary to achieve full victory - something which would require a fundamental rethinking of both our strategy and tactics, and may also require the imposition of a draft - withdrawal in the very near term is our only option. It's not a good option, mind you, but if we are not willing to fully commit, it appears to be our only one.

Finally, third: Taken together, these points show just how enormous the consequences are for our missed opportunities in Afghanistan. Had we stayed there and fully committed to winning the war, catching bin Laden, and rebuilding Afghan society, the benefits would have been enormous. The jihadi movement would have failed, and many of the trends leading to its spread would have been reversed. But this president chose otherwise, creating more problems than he had solved. It did not have to be this way, and it should not have been this way. But it is this way, and now we must decide what to do next.