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I wonder if this had anything to do with his forced resignation? Take a look, first at the NYT story and then at the text of memo itself. Some excerpts:

SUBJECT: Iraq — Illustrative New Courses of Action

The situation in Iraq has been evolving, and U.S. forces have adjusted, over time, from major combat operations to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence. In my view it is time for a major adjustment. Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.

One day before the election, and two days before his dismissal, Rumsfeld told the president his legacy was heading towards failure.

Here are some of what he defines as the more attractive options available:

¶Conduct an accelerated draw-down of U.S. bases. We have already reduced from 110 to 55 bases. Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.

¶Retain high-end SOF capability and necessary support structure to target Al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other Coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for the ISF.

¶Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S. forces would leave their province.

¶Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, “If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it.” No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence[...]

¶Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start “taking our hand off the bicycle seat”), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.

¶Provide money to key political and religious leaders (as Saddam Hussein did), to get them to help us get through this difficult period.

¶Initiate a massive program for unemployed youth. It would have to be run by U.S. forces, since no other organization could do it.

¶Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis. This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not “lose.”

¶Recast the U.S. military mission and the U.S. goals (how we talk about them) — go minimalist.

Between the timetables for withdrawal (I thought that would enable the terrorists?) and the suggestions we act more like Saddam, we have a bunch of suggestions that read like a memo sent to a schoolteacher on how to handle playground recess.

But the last two are the ones that really got me. Change the rhetoric to make sure they lower expectations enough that whatever happens, it won't be seen as a loss. Brilliant. Their self-proclaimed "clash of civilizations," and Rumsfeld is suggesting that it is rhetoric that matters most. Erm... no. Try again.

Here, for the record, are all of his less attractive options:

¶Continue on the current path.

¶Move a large fraction of all U.S. Forces into Baghdad to attempt to control it.

¶Increase Brigade Combat Teams and U.S. forces in Iraq substantially.

¶Set a firm withdrawal date to leave. Declare that with Saddam gone and Iraq a sovereign nation, the Iraqi people can govern themselves. Tell Iran and Syria to stay out.

¶Assist in accelerating an aggressive federalism plan, moving towards three separate states — Sunni, Shia, and Kurd.

¶Try a Dayton-like process.

That would, so far as I can tell, be a list of most of the options being discussed by "serious people" in DC today. Except, that is, for one: the Murtha plan. Correct me if I'm mistaken here, but one of the bullet items above sounds a lot like what Murtha had in mind, only with less specificity:

¶Retain high-end SOF capability and necessary support structure to target Al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other Coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for the ISF.

Leave Special Forces teams in Iraq, but redeploy the rest of our soldiers elsewhere in the region.

On a side note... the White House sure is leaking like a sieve these days, isn't it?

UPDATE: Andrew Sullivan has a great take on the memo. Here's the short version of its contents:

Meanwhile, blame, blame, blame: blame every other government agency; blame the Iraqis; blame the country; blame the soldiers. And, of course: never take responsibility.

And here's an interesting thought he had on its source:

Here's a mischievous thought. What if the two most recent leaks - the Hadley Memo and the Rumsfeld Memo - came from the same source? What if they were designed to kill any attempt by Bush and Cheney to pretend things are okay, that Maliki is viable, and that a revamped effort can work?

And what if the leaker were a man who just got fired and who's skilled at bureaucratic payback? Just musing.

I can't wait to see the push-back from the administration on this one.