As you consider the administration's claims that Democrats are "attempting to micromanage our commanders in Iraq", remember this:
At two very key moments, President Bush overruled his own military commanders, forcing their early retirement so that he could replace them with men who would do his bidding.
Most recently, when military commanders wouldn't back his plan for a "surge" into Baghdad, Bush pushed them out the door, opening the way for Gen. Petraeus. Petraeus was picked after the strategy had been established, and not vice versa.
Second, and much more importantly, remember that prior to the war in Iraq, Army Chief of Staff Shinseki was publicly rebuked by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz for having the audacity to tell the congress that "several hundred thousand soldiers" would be needed to secure post-war Iraq. His estimate was politically inconvenient, so he was chastised by men who had never put on a uniform and pushed out the door and into retirement. His estimate was, of course, eventually proved correct.
And yet, despite their own personal history, Bush and Cheney want to lecture America about how the commanders on the ground must never be questioned.
As to the proper balance between civilian and military leadership, I'm going to turn to Lt. Col. Yingling's article for an explanation of how this issue looks to those wearing our nation's uniform:
However much it is influenced by passion and probability, war is ultimately an instrument of policy and its conduct is the responsibility of policymakers. War is a social activity undertaken on behalf of the nation; Augustine counsels us that the only purpose of war is to achieve a better peace. The choice of making war to achieve a better peace is inherently a value judgment in which the statesman must decide those interests and beliefs worth killing and dying for. The military man is no better qualified than the common citizen to make such judgments. He must therefore confine his input to his area of expertise — the estimation of strategic probabilities.
Our system is designed so that civilian leaders, not generals, make decisions about when and how to go to war. It is designed so that the president and congress, and not the generals in the field, have the last word on how and when to fight. Battlefield tactics and strategy rightly belong to those in uniform; diplomatic and political tactics and strategy do not. This debate is entirely about the later, the statements of the administration notwithstanding. The men and women wearing our nation's uniform already understand that. If only more of our politicians did, too.


