One of the most frustrating things for me about the war debate has been the way the pro-and anti-Iraq War factions often talk past one another. Its been that way since before the war began, and it seems almost inevitable that it will continue well after it ends. And this post by Robert Farley over at Tapped is a perfect illustration of why.
Farley is reacting to a new piece on the Anbar Awakening from Major Niel Smith and Colonel Seth MacFarland, two of the men who helped make it happen. Here's the small bit Robert highlights:
The "Anbar Awakening" of Sunni tribal leaders and their supporters that began in September 2006 near Ramadi seemd to come out of nowhere. But the change that led to the defeat of Al-Qaeda in Ramadi- what some have called the "Gettysburg of Iraq"- was not a random event. It was a result of a concerted plan executed by U.S. forces in Ramadi. Tactical victory became a strategic turning point when farsighted senior leaders, both Iraqi and American, replicated the Ramadi model throughout Anbar province, in Baghdad, and other parts of the country.
Smith and MacFarland are absolutely right: the tactics employed by US forces in Ramadi were a huge turning point for the war, a success that changed the war in many positive ways. But Farley is also absolutely right: although quite successful tactically, it was strategically incoherent. Farley:
While reading this piece I was struck by its echoes of a chapter in Peter Paret's edited volume Makers of Modern Strategy. In his chapter German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare 1914-1945, Michael Geyer makes that argument that the German Wehrmacht, an exceptionally effective tactical and operational military organization, allowed those lower levels to overcome strategic considerations. In other words, German officers were quite brilliant at figuring out how to make war "work" at the tactical and operational level, but making it "work" there led to general strategic incoherence, because the means never matched the ends.
The Smith and MacFarland remind me of that chapter because it seems like the same thing is going on; innovative, smart American officers are trying to figure things out at the tactical and operational level, but at the strategic level incoherence reigns. In this particular case, Smith and MacFarland brought peace to Ramadi, but at the cost (in my view) of permanently gutting the capacity of the Iraqi state; arming local groups and politically enabling them is, as I've discussed before, a strategy of anti-state building. In this particular story, it was the "farsighted senior leaders" in Iraq and the US who should have understood this. I don't know whether these leaders misunderstood the implications of arming local tribal groups, or whether they understood but just figured (perhaps accurately) that things couldn't get any worse.
Arming the local militias made enormous tactical success, but it directly undermines our efforts to build up an Iraqi state. And given that our entire project in Iraq hinges on successful state-building, that means that we have allowed our short-term tactical needs to overwhelm our long-term national security goals. Remember, a strong central government is supposed to be key to fighting the influence of al Qaeda in Iraq. Until it exists, we are told by defenders of this war that we cannot risk leaving. But at the very same time, we are told that the Anbar Awakening is an enormous success in our fight against al Qaeda. And that is so fundamentally incoherent that it makes my head hurt.
When you turn all strategic decision making over to "the commanders on the ground," this will almost always be the inevitable result. When formulated properly, tactics flow from strategy. If the strategy set properly, it is possible to consider the short and long terms simultaneously. If it is not, the short term inevitably overwhelms the long-term, opening the door to strategic disaster.
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