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Spencer Ackerman reports:

The trend toward increased violence in early 2008 does not rise to the level of the bloodshed Iraq experienced in mid-to-late 2006, before the surge began. But it does underscore the limits of what the surge achieved, according to U.S. government officials and outside experts, even on the security front where the Bush administration argued it was most successful. "The fact is, the ISF [Iraqi security forces] couldn't fulfill a major campaign against an insurgent group on its own," said a U.S. intelligence analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity. "I personally think that's the real story. The ISF, despite the surge, and despite the [rhetoric from the Bush administration that] 'they'll stand up as we stand down,' couldn't fulfill their core requirement."

Indeed, Iraqi forces could not suppress the Mahdi Army in Iraq's very capital. U.S. armor units rushed to the aid of Maliki's police, many of whom were forced from their checkpoints or opted to join Sadr's insurrectionists. The Mahdi Army's largely amateurish fighters managed to destroy a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, the state-of-the-art U.S. engineering answer to Iraq's signature improvised explosive devices. While U.S. military officials could hardly resist a request from the U.S.-supported Iraqi prime minister for relief, the fact remained that U.S. soldiers became combatants in an inter-Shiite power struggle--and appeared not to have been part of Maliki's planning. "The planning was not done under our auspices at all," an anonymous U.S. military commander told McClatchy.

It should be noted that there are no additional forces to relieve those now in Iraq and maintain current levels. The U.S. commanding general in Iraq, DavidPetraeus, and the leading U.S. diplomat, Amb. Ryan Crocker , will testify before Congress next week in favor of pausing scheduled troop reductions. But military overstretch and the grueling tempo of operations for U.S. soldiers and Marines ensures that U.S. military strength in Iraq has just ended its apogee--and still the Sadrist uprising exploded...

But the surge was never intended to bring violence down to 2005 levels--when, it's worth remembering, violence was so pervasive that the first wave of U.S. politicians reacted by calling for withdrawal--nor to give Iraqi security forces the opportunity to skirmish with militias. President George W. Bush presented the surge to the American nation on Jan. 10, 2007 as an effort to enable political progress.

On that front, some experts say, Sadr's victory over Maliki exposed the weakness of the U.S.'s partner. "In spite of holding de jure power, Maliki can't exert territorial control over even the Shiite regions of Iraq," said Robert Farley, a professor at the University of Kentucky's Paterson School of Diplomacy. "While the surge has reduced violence, it has failed utterly to create Iraqi state capacity. The Iraqi central government is as far as ever from exerting control over other armed groups within Iraq."

..."It's very clear now that--after five years of American training and assistance--the militias still wield more power and influence than any national, organized Iraqi military or police force," Friedman, who edits the veterans' advocacy blog VetVoice.com, wrote in an e-mail. "This is exactly what both Maliki and the Bush administration were trying to disprove last week. Unfortunately for them, they only succeeded in showing how inept and dependent the Maliki government is on outside forces."

... The contortions necessary to preserve the myth of the surge have been impressive. Even as fierce fighting raged in Basra and Sadr City--fighting that would ultimately redound to the detriment of the U.S.-backed Iraqi government--Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon spokesman, pronounced on Thursday, "At this early stage, it looks as though it is a by-product of the success of the surge, in the sense that the Iraqi government has grown and increased in capability to the point where they now feel confident going after extremists--Shi'a extremists in a part of the country that had been--that they had not exerted great influence over. And so we, at this point, though still early, would view it as a sign of success."

Lies. All lies. And nothing but lies....

UPDATE: Peter D. Feaver, a former Special Advisor to the NSC from June 2005 to July 2007, has an interesting article in the conservative news magazine Commentary called Anatomy of the Surge. In it, he makes clear what the true purpose of The Surge actually was: to kick the can down the road and leave the problem for the next administration to solve:

Over the past sixteen months, the United States has altered its trajectory in Iraq. We are no longer headed toward a catastrophic defeat and may be on the path to a remarkable victory. As a result, the next President, Democrat or Republican, may well find it easier to adopt the broad contours of this administration's current strategy than to jeopardize progress by changing course abruptly.

That would be an ironic, but satisfying, outcome to the tortuous journey on which the Bush administration's policy toward Iraq, and this nation's views of Iraq, have been traveling over the past three years.

The administration's description of the long-term American goal--a democratic Iraq that can defend itself, govern itself, and sustain itself, and will be an ally in the war on terror--has remained consistent from the time the war was launched in 2003 until now. What has shifted, due to sobering experience, is its sense of how long it might take to achieve this goal: a time frame that has stretched from months, to years, and even to decades.

I witnessed the shift first-hand. For two years, from June 2005 to July 2007, I left my teaching position at Duke to join the National Security Council staff as a special adviser for strategic planning, and in that capacity I worked closely on Iraq policy. By the middle of 2005, it was painfully obvious to everyone involved that the only decisive outcome that could be achieved during President Bush's tenure was the triumph of our enemies, America's withdrawal, and Iraq's descent into a hellish chaos as yet undreamed of.

The challenge, therefore, was to develop and implement a workable strategy that could be handed over to Bush's successor. Although important progress could be made on that strategy during Bush's watch, ultimately it would be carried through by the next President. This was the reality behind the course followed by the administration in 2005-2006, and it remains the reality behind the new and different course the administration has been following since 2007.

Justin Logan translates:

If, by the grace of God, some subsequent U.S. president can manage to extricate us from the Iraqi quagmire without a total meltdown, the Bushies will clap each other on the back, declaring themselves visionaries. If, on the other hand, Iraq flames out entirely on the watch of a subsequent administration, the Bushies can play the Dolschtoss card and explain how The Surge Was Working and would have continued working were it not for the fecklessness of the Obama/Clinton/McCain administration.

Wonderful, no?