If we're going to revisit the whole argument about what's the matter with "What's the Matter With Kansas" argument, can we at least please do it comprehensively?
April 14, 2008
December 18, 2007
Friendly Fascism?
Matt's entirely missing the point of Jonah Goldberg's ridiculous "liberals are friendly fascists" thesis. First, the Goldberg quote:
"The quintessential liberal fascist isn't an SS storm trooper; it is a female grade-school teacher with an education degree from Brown or Swarthmore."
To which Matt responded:
Despite Jonah Goldberg's notions, it turns out that you can't really major in education at Swarthmore. Sara was also telling me that a bachelor's degree from Swarthmore under any major wouldn't ordinarily qualify you to teach grade school without some additional certification.
Matt's responding here as if Jonah wanted an honest debate. He doesn't. In fact, I would argue he doesn't even want a dishonest debate. What he wants is to taunt and bully the effete liberal elite. He's hoping that if he calls them (us?) enough names we will respond as just like this: by reacting in a way that will allow him to portray liberals as whining, complaining elites.
At bottom, the modern conservative movement has become an anti-intellectual movement. Honestly, how else can you explain a "serious writer" producing an entire book that makes so little historical, theoretical, and intellectual sense? The point isn't to win an argument, but to pick a fight. The Swarthmore line is meant as a taunt, not an argument, one designed to goad liberals into engaging in a barroom brawl as if it was some sort of intellectual debate. The taunt is designed to provoke a response that proves his real thesis: that liberals are pussies who have no idea how to fight.
The pattern goes something like this:
Goldberg: The quintessential liberal fascist isn't an SS storm trooper; it is a female grade-school teacher with an education degree from Brown or Swarthmore
Matt Y: it turns out that you can't really major in education at Swarthmore. Sara was also telling me that a bachelor's degree from Swarthmore under any major wouldn't ordinarily qualify you to teach grade school without some additional certification.
Golberg's fans: Ha ha ha! Look at that ridiculous Matt Y! He knows all about that crazy liberal Swarthmore! He thinks I care what kind of degrees you can get at there! Liberal snob always thinks they know what's right! Ha ha! C'mon... who care about knowledge!
So how best to respond to this sort of ridiculousness? My suggestion is that we simply collectively ignore him. Jonah is just begging for a fight, and nothing will bother him more than if he doesn't get the attention he so desperately craves. When a bully taunts you there really are only two choices: Pound him in the head, or walk away. Either way, you win and he loses. Given that the first isn't really an option here, I'd suggest we all go for option two.
September 7, 2006
Fiasco - A Review in Four Parts
So...
The first part of my long promised review of Fiasco, Thomas E. Ricks' account of the war in Iraq, so far. The review will proceed in four parts, beginning today with a general overview of Ricks' methodology and a brief summary of his findings. From there, there will be three sections detailing the body of the work, each written to match the three sections of the book. Along the way, I will of course offer some of my own thoughts and conclusions, including how this book has changed my thinking on the war.
Ricks by trade is a military correspondent. As The Washington Post's senior Pentagon correspondent, and previous to that, as a reporter covering the same beat for the Wall Street Journal, Ricks has spent the last 25 years covering the United States Military. Along the way he has published several books, including Making the Corps and Soldier's Duty, two books that have earned as much respect within the military as without. He is, in short, a consummate journalist, one who is respected both by the subjects he covers and his peers in the newspaper industry, a rare feat in today's hyper-partisan environment.
Understanding Ricks' background is critical to understanding this book. This is a history of the US military and its involvement in Iraq, first and foremost. Although political actors and decisions do indeed feature prominently in this work, they do so only with regard to their impact on the military and its mission in Iraq. Where Ricks covers the debate over pre-war intelligence, for example, he does so only to explore how this debate guided and structured the subsequent invasion and occupation. What this book is, therefore, is a history of the Iraq war from the perspective of the US military. What it is not is an account of the partisan politics associated with that mission.
As Ricks acknowledges in the book's Notes, his goal was not to produce an academic history of the period; the events he is describing are simply far too recent for that. And although writing about recent, and at times current, events does present certain difficulties, it also provides several distinct advantages. Most notably, it allows the author the opportunity to interview a far greater number of event participants, often in circumstances where the events in question are still quite fresh in their minds. As a Pentagon correspondent, and as an embedded member of the 1st Armored Division in Iraq, Ricks was perfectly placed to take full advantage of that fact.
In weaving his narrative, Ricks relies almost exclusively on sources within the military for his portrayal of events. In those instances where he does turn to the civilian world for information, it is usually to the civilians in charge of the military that he turns, relying only on political officials for information when absolutely necessary. I simply cannot say this often enough - the goal of this book is not to tell a partisan tale. It is instead to tell the story of how and why the US military came to fight this war, this way, at this time.
In addition to his interviews and email correspondence with members of the military and its leadership, Ricks also relied extensively on the military's own reporting for his information. Over the course of his work, he estimates he read in excess of 37,000 pages of official documents, work product that for the most part has been ignored by both pundits and politicians alike. Throughout the book he provides accounts of memos, hearings, press conferences, and Power Point Presentations delivered here at home and out in the field.
It is in light of this background that the title should be interpreted.
Labeling the war a "fiasco" is not a political judgment. It is reflection of the reality of the US military operation in Iraq as detailed by the military itself. Again, although it rarely receives coverage in the media, the US military has already begun to evaluate its performance in the early days of the war. At institutions like the Army War College and the Marine Corps War College, analysis and criticism of the war is ongoing, extensive, and most importantly, consequential. As Ricks' demonstrates in the third section of the book, the criticism has in fact led to extensive change in our approach to the war, a shift reflected in part in the much-touted security crackdown in Baghdad, for example.
Ricks findings can be summarized in two words: Leadership matters. Although this statement is true in all aspects of life, it is particularly salient in military matters. A military organization is, after all, an organization designed to train and motivate citizens to willingly sacrifice their lives in defense of their society. It is a brave, noble, and honorable thing they are asked to do, but it is comes with deep personal costs, both for themselves and their families.
One of the most critical aspects of military leadership grows out of the distinction between strategy and tactics. While strategy is a decision about where you want to go, tactics are a decision about how to get there. Correctly formulated, tactics flow from strategy. And in war, it is the leadership, both civilian and military, that determines strategy. Uninformed by the proper strategy, the best tactics in the world will almost never lead you to your proper destination. Clauswitz understood this. Sun Tzu understood this. Patton and Eisenhower understood this. But in this war...
But I get ahead of myself. First, Part I, "Containment," Ricks take on the pre-war world, and what it would mean for the US military in Iraq.
More soon....
April 2008 (1)
December 2007 (1)
September 2006 (1)
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