May 6, 2008

Redefining Incompetence

NYT:

Law professors are sometimes influential, but in a general way. Their insights can help shape the law, over time and at the margins.


But John F. Duffy, who teaches at the George Washington University Law School, is a different kind of law professor. He has discovered a constitutional flaw in the appointment process over the last eight years for judges who decide patent appeals and disputes, and his short paper documenting the problem seems poised to undo thousands of patent decisions concerning claims worth billions of dollars.

His basic point does not appear to be in dispute. Since 2000, patent judges have been appointed by a government official without the constitutional power to do so.

"I actually ran it by a number of colleagues who teach administrative law and constitutional law," Professor Duffy said, recalling his own surprise at finding such a fundamental and important flaw. He thought he must have been missing something.

"No one thought it was a close question," Professor Duffy said.

Charles Miller, a spokesman for the Justice Department, said the government had no comment. "There is really nothing we can say at this time," he said.

But the Justice Department has already all but conceded that Professor Duffy is right. Given the opportunity to dispute him in a December appeals court filing, government lawyers said only that they were at work on a legislative solution.

They did warn that the impact of Professor Duffy's discovery could be cataclysmic for the patent world, casting "a cloud over many thousands of board decisions" and "unsettling the expectations of patent holders and licensees across the nation." But they did not say Professor Duffy was wrong.

If it was a legislative mistake, it may turn out to be a big one. The patent court hears appeals from people and companies whose patent applications were turned down by patent examiners, and it decides disputes over who invented something first. There is often a lot of money involved.

The problem Professor Duffy identified at least arguably invalidates every decision of the patent court decided by a three-judge panel that included at least one judge appointed after March 2000.

The appeals court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, ducked the question in January, which was easy to do because the company on the losing side raised it only after the court had already issued its decision. The company, Translogic Technology, was frank in explaining the delay: it had not known of the issue until Professor Duffy published his article.

Last month, Translogic asked the Supreme Court to consider the question.

Some provisions of the Constitution are open to interpretation, but some are clear. The Constitution says, for instance, that some government officials may be appointed only by the president, the courts or "heads of departments" like the attorney general or the secretary of commerce.

But a 1999 law changed the way administrative patent judges are appointed, substituting the director of the Patent and Trademark Office for the secretary of commerce. Jennifer Rankin Byrne, a spokeswoman for the office, said 46 of the 74 judges on the patent court, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, were appointed under the new law.

"That method of appointment is almost certainly unconstitutional," Professor Duffy wrote in his paper, first published last summer on an influential patent law blog.

There are two possible contrary arguments. One is that the patent judges are not the sort of "inferior officers" to whom the Constitution's appointments clause applies, but instead mere employees (and thus inferior to inferior officers). But the Supreme Court has already ruled, in Freytag v. Commissioner in 1991, that special trial judges of the tax court are inferior officers, and the patent judges have more power and discretion than they do.

The other possible argument is that the director of the patent office is entitled to appoint the judges because he is the head of a department. The Freytag decision "pretty clearly forecloses" that argument, Professor Duffy wrote. Freytag said the departments referred to in the Constitution are "executive departments like the cabinet-level departments." But the patent office is part of the Commerce Department, and its director is an under secretary of the department -- not its head.

The question of who gets to appoint "inferior officers" may seem a trivial one. But the Constitution's framers cared about it.

The "manipulation of official appointments" was "one of the American revolutionary generation's greatest grievances against executive power," Justice Harry A. Blackmun explained in Freytag. The framers understood, he continued, "that by limiting the appointment power they could ensure that those who wielded it were accountable to political force and the will of the people."

The Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department, which is supposed to catch constitutional problems in pending legislation, only last year published a 41-page memorandum on the importance and limits of the appointments clause. People who wield the delegated sovereign powers of the federal government are officers subject to the appointments clause, the memorandum said, and judges certainly wield such power.

"Appointments clause issues were our bread and butter," said John O. McGinnis, a law professor at Northwestern who was deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel from 1987 to 1991. Professor McGinnis said Professor Duffy's analysis appeared correct.

"You have to understand that O.L.C. looks at just an enormous number of bills," he added. "A line attorney might just miss it."

The Supreme Court will soon decide whether to take up the question, in the case involving Translogic, one with $86 million at stake.

"An improperly constituted tribunal should not be deciding the case," said a lawyer for Translogic, Robert A. Long of Covington & Burling in Washington. "You have to go back and have the decision made by a properly constituted panel."

So you mean to tell me that for 8 years, the president has been nominating and confirming patent judges without involving the Senate, and no one bothered to question this? Not once along the way did someone stop and think about how obviously unconstitutional this was? Not the people nominating the judges? Not the judges themselves? No one?

Meanwhile, this article really is quite remarkable in its ability to cover substance and provide historical background. In our political coverage we get nonsense, but in an obscure patent law article we get good journalism? Wha?

Judicial Activism Is A Meaningless Idea

McCain apparently gave a big speech today on judges and judicial activism. After Bush v. Gore (2000), you would think "judicial activism" would be a criticism impossible for Republicans to make, but apparently not.

This idea that anyone, Republican or Democrat, selects judges for their intelligence and analytical ability, and not their judicial philosophy, is ridiculous. Conservatives nominate justices that will decide cases consistent with a conservative / Federalist Society philosophy, and liberals nominate judges that will decide cases consistent with a liberal philosophy. To pretend otherwise is to both ignore reality and assume citizens are uninformed idiots.

"Activism" really is just code for "decisions I don't like." If you like the way Bush v. Gore ignored the primacy of the states in our constitutionally defined electoral system, then it was a perfectly valid decision. If you don't, it was an example of judicial activism at its worst. What matters here is whether or not you agree with the decision, and not some abstract and entirely undefinable notion of "activism."

UPDATE: Much, much more from Brian Tamanaha here. Conclusion?

Through a statistical comparison, Posner shows that conservative Justices on the current court more consistently vote in accordance with their political values than do liberal Justices (some of the numbers can be found here); and that the current generation of Republican appointed federal court of appeals judges shows a significantly higher proportion of conservative votes than Republican appointed judges over the past eighty years (Republican appointed federal appellate judges from 1925-2002 vote conservative 55.8% of the time; Republican appointed currently sitting judges vote conservative 66.9%); whereas there is no significant change in the conservative voting pattern (49.6%; 49.7%) of Democratic appointed judges between these two periods, and a reduction in their liberal votes (43.5%; 39.5%).


Put more simply: the Supreme Court Justices and Appellate Judges appointed by Presidents Reagan, Bush and Bush vote consistent with their political views at a higher rate than previous Republican appointees, and at a higher rate than Democratic appointees. That's what the numbers show.

March 27, 2008

Bits and Bobs

+ Publius has one of the best defenses I've read of judicial review in a long, long time.

+ Last year, the Supreme Court ordered the EPA to begin regulating carbon emissions under the Clean Air Act. This year, the EPA's political hacks decided to ignore the Court. Brilliant!

+ Can we please stop with the "Free Mumia!" nonsense now? Please?

February 21, 2008

SCOTUS On Personal Injury Liability Lawsuits

The Supreme Court handed down a major victory for the Bush administration today. Here's the NYT summary:

Makers of medical devices like implantable defibrillators or breast implants are immune from liability for personal injuries as long as the Food and Drug Administration approved the device before it was marketed and it meets the agency's specifications, the Supreme Court ruled on Wednesday.


The 8-to-1 decision was a victory for the Bush administration, which for years has sought broad authority to pre-empt tougher state regulation.

In 2004, the administration reversed longstanding federal policy and began arguing that "premarket approval" of a new medical device by the F.D.A. overrides most claims for damages under state law. Because federal law makes no provision for damage suits against device makers, injured patients have turned to state law and have won substantial awards.

The Bush administration will continue its push for pre-emption in another F.D.A. case that the court has accepted for its next term, on whether the agency's approval of a drug, as opposed to a device, pre-empts personal injury suits. Drugs and medical devices are regulated under separate laws....

It was not immediately clear how many of the thousands of lawsuits against medical device manufacturers would be affected, though some pending cases will almost certainly be nullified.

The decision, for example, does not foreclose lawsuits claiming that a device was made improperly, in violation of F.D.A. specifications. Cases may also be brought under state laws that mirror federal rules, as opposed to supplementing them.

In theory, this makes perfect sense. If the FDA has approved a device and that device is flawed, the maker of that device deserves some sort of protection. In reality, there are several problems with this.

First, and most fundamentally, this means that the FDA's approval process must be rock solid. If liability is to be foreclosed after approval, then the approval process must be far more rigorous than it currently is.

Second, recognizing that no approval process could ever be perfect, if a device is approved and then causes widespread harm, will citizens be able to sue the FDA for failing in its duties to protect citizens?

And finally, third, there is the potential issue of moral hazard. Under the previous system, device makers who manipulated the FDA process to get approval for an unsafe device could be sued by both citizens and government alike, dramatically increasing the potential risk and penalty for lying to regulators. Now, however, the FDA approval grants a form of immunity, decreasing the potential cost for lying. FDA approval will act something similar to home base in a game of tag - if you can make it home, you're safe, no matter what. That has the potential to dramatically increase the incentive to push the envelope during the approval process. And that brings us right back around to point one.

If the FDA were a fully funded, completely independent agency that was fully insulated from the influence of those it regulates, this would make perfect sense. But it is not, of course, nor will it ever be.

This decision may be right on its merits, but it creates a serious policy problem that congress will need to solve. Thankfully, it looks like Rep. Waxman is already on the case.

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